generated from bisco/codex-bootstrap
bisco
41 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
41 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
# Security
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- NGINX is the only published service. MariaDB is restricted to an internal network;
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WordPress is reachable only from NGINX and the database network.
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- Production startup rejects placeholder or short database passwords. `.env` is
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ignored and real secrets must come from the deployment secret manager.
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- WordPress uses its normal capability, nonce, authentication, cookie, and password
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controls. Theme settings sanitize input and templates escape output.
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- Structured Shows and Gallery content is editable in WordPress admin but is consumed
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by the homepage only; it is not exposed as standalone public routes or REST
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collections.
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- File editing is always disabled. Production also disables web-based core, theme, and
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plugin changes; patched images are rebuilt and redeployed instead.
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- XML-RPC and comments are disabled. NGINX blocks PHP execution below uploads, dotfiles,
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and direct `wp-config.php` requests, and rate-limits login/public requests. Apache
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also denies uploaded PHP files and direct access to sensitive WordPress internals as
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defense in depth. Public REST user enumeration and author archives are disabled.
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- Security headers include CSP, same-origin framing, content-type protection, a strict
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referrer policy, and a restrictive Permissions Policy. WordPress compatibility still
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requires inline style/script CSP allowances; do not treat this CSP as an XSS sanitizer.
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- Forwarded client/protocol headers are overwritten by default. Trust mode is permitted
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only behind a restricted load balancer that overwrites those headers.
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- Direct TLS is fail-closed until a certificate exists. Certbot has a read-only root,
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no Docker socket, dropped capabilities, and narrowly scoped volumes.
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- Containers are not privileged and do not use host networking or the Docker socket.
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WordPress/Apache retains the capabilities needed by the official image internally,
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but no WordPress port is published. A containerized security test fails if the
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WordPress service is configured with host-published ports.
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- Persistent state uses host-based bind mounts. Keep those paths outside the public web
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root, restrict host access, never make them world-writable, and run
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`./scripts/prepare-host-volumes.sh` when paths or image user IDs change.
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- WordPress/Apache access logs are disabled to avoid duplicate client metadata and
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healthcheck noise; NGINX remains the single request log and PHP warnings/errors stay
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visible.
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- Admin MFA, an IP/VPN allowlist, SMTP, malware scanning, log aggregation, and a secret
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manager remain production operator responsibilities.
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- Backups and uploads can contain personal data. Encrypt, restrict, retain, and delete
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them according to the applicable privacy policy.
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See [ADR-0001](adr/0001-wordpress-single-page.md).
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